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KEITH ROBSON
Connecting Science to the
Economic: Accounting Calculation
and the Visibility of Research
and Development
The Argument
The presence or absence of scientific research in productive organizations is a
subject of professional concern to the scientific and engineering community, and
of wider interest to political agencies in the United Kingdom. This paper will
explore aspects of the economic visibility of scientific practices in productive
organizations: how, by whom, and in what contexts research and development
practices have been constructed, monitored, and disseminated as economic
statistics within and beyond the modern industrial enterprise. The paper will
focus on the construction of scientific practices as accounting and economic
signifiers within their organizational context: the growth of mechanisms for the
connection of scientific practices to economic calculations. How companies
account for R&D has been elevated by particular government agencies through
the accountancy bodies, as a way of forging a relationship between economic
calculation and the scientific practices of U.K. companies.
Introduction
The place of science and technology in modern society may seem both manifest
and secure. Even those who profess to lack understanding of science and its
methods can acknowledge the importance of the technical results that are present
in their everyday lives. It is perhaps this taken-for-grantedness that makes
"techno-science" appear as a constant and unchanging force in social life, a force
that is linked to improvements in the quality of life.
While acknowledging the technical payoffs of scientific endeavor that have been
achieved, certain discourses do not pronounce the status of science and technology
in our societies as necessarily secure. Most prominent are those that express
* The support of the ICAEW Research Board is gratefully acknowledged.
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worries that society is insufficiently appreciative of the value of science, or further,
that the project of modernity is threatened by the lack of attention to the scientific
practices at the base of modern society (e.g., Royal Society 1985).
It is the problem of valuing and promoting science in the United Kingdom that
provides the empirical focus for this paper. During the 1980s a new problematiza-
tion of the value of science and technology emerged in the context of changing
governmental discourses and a severe economic recession. Out of these concerns
new ways of thinking about the problem of science in the U.K. economy began to
address the problematical relationship between the visibility and calculability of
scientific practices; accounting techniques came to be seen as one means of
connecting science to the national economy by enhancing individual managers'
responsibility for science and technology through economic calculation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly addresses the
question of the varying ways in which the role of science and technology in
national contexts has been understood. It is argued that far from being practices
whose values and benefits are constant, and in some senses "obvious," scientific
research and technological developments have been connected, through particular
discourses, to many different questions and issues. This argument is extended in
the following section to focus specifically on the linkages that have been forged in
the post-World War II era between national indicators of scientific endeavor and
measures of national economic strength and future prosperity. To illustrate the
changing relationships between scientific practices and economic calculation, the
case of the development of "accounting for research and development" in the
United Kingdom during the decade of the 1980s is examined. Out of a specific
constellation of governmental programs and managerial discourses, the problem
of promoting scientific and technological innovations in the United Kingdom was
connected to the calculability of such practices and their visibility to those within
and outside of the productive enterprise. By creating systems of individual and
corporate responsibility, new forms of accounting calculation were finally cast as
the means for promoting economic growth through the expansion of scientific
research.
Valuing Science and Technology
In many of the countries of the industrialized west the degree and status of
scientific research has at some time been brought into question (see Williams
1973). It seems perhaps simple to formulate such arguments in terms of the
occupational interests of scientists and engineers (e.g., Finniston Report 1980), or
in terms of the economic motivations of defense contractors or inventors. One
might of course argue that there are those who have a clear stake in promoting an
increased allocation of resources to scientific and technological practices, and
therefore that such discourses merely reflect the values of the community of
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scientific practitioners. But this would ignore the specific contexts of such dis-
courses and the attachment of science and technology to different social and
political rationales.
While it is true that worrying about science and technology stretches back into
the last century and beyond (Hobsbawm 1969; Rose and Rose 1969), the form of
these worries has been shaped by a number of different problems, priorities, and
rationales. The presence or absence of science and technology has been taken as a
signifier of many different questions. For example, Searle (1971) explored the
links between the discourse of "national efficiency," British military failures in the
Boer War and the economic recession of the last quarter of the nineteenth century
(ibid., chap. 2). In relation to these events a specific figuration of concerns emerged
linking an apparent decline ("degeneration") in the character and mental capacities
of the population with an unscientific military, educational, and productive orga-
nization at the national level. The speeches and writings of Liberal and Tory
politicians, Fabian socialists, eugenicists, and journalists were constitutive of a
particular pattern of discourse through which recent national failures were ana-
lyzed in terms of an attitude to science. In contrast, Wilhelmenian Germany was
re-presented as an ideal of national efficiency and organization (ibid., 32). Anxieties
were also expressed at the absence of scientific advice at the government level
(ibid., 84-85). As Gummett (1980, 22) notes, the National Physical Laboratory,
founded in 1899, was modeled on the German example.1
The key point here is that the character of such discourses displayed a significant
break with prior discussions of science. Earlier justifications of scientific and
technological endeavor emphasized their importance in terms of "high culture"
(Rose and Rose 1969, 188); the legitimation of scientific quests had, previously,
seemed to focus on their gentlemanly status and contribution to national "culture."
During World War II the success of key scientists such as J. B. S. Haldane, J. D.
Bernal, and P. M. S. Blackett in their governmental roles provided a distinctive
legitimation for scientific ventures. As Steward and Wield (1984, 196) note, for
Haldane and Blackett the contribution of the scientific community to the war
effort sealed the case for more national planning of science and technology. The
return of the commitment to a liberal economy in the postwar era, coupled with
doubts as to the radical political orientation of some of the aforementioned
scientists (Gummett 1980,29-30; Edgerton and Hughes 1989,421), prevented the
realization of this program, but a new and closer relationship between science and
government was soon to emerge (see Vig 1968).
In the aftermath of World War II, and partly in connection with the program of
Marshall Aid and postwar reconstruction, the formation of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) exemplified a new conception of science
and technology as the dominant factors of successful economic production. Origi-
1
 This refers to the Physikalische-Technische Reichanstalt in Charlottenburg, "the State owned
research and testing facilities of industrial and commercial significance" (Vig 1968, 11).
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nally envisioned as a forum for the discussion of scientific policies and national
problems of productivity, the OEEC was reconstituted in 1961 as the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an association for the
advancement of science and technology policies among the industrialized nations.
Whatever the success or failure of the OECD as a supposedly international
forum for science policy, its most lasting achievement was in the definition and
promotion of research and development statistics. Indeed, R&D became insepar-
able from the rules established by the OECD for its statistical identification and
collection. R&D became the measure of science and technology. As the OECD
assembled cross-national statistics of R&D expenditure within member states
(e.g., OECD 1965, 1968, 1975), so the constitution of R&D activity (as "pure,"
"applied" or "developmental") in governmental publications followed the guide-
lines of the OECD-sponsored "Frascati Manual"(OECD 1961). These definitions
in turn influenced those of other arenas — such as, for example, accounting policy
(e.g., ASC1978), the U.K. Annual Review of Government Funded R&D (Cabinet
Office 1986), and the costing of R&D in noncompetitive contracts with the defense
department (House of Commons Defence Committee 1982).
The visibility given to science and technology by the standardization of R&D, in
terms of definition and collation, facilitated the process of drawing comparisons
between the commitments of individual nations to scientific research. Science and
technology, principally at the national level, became a calculable space (Miller
1992) within which programs and policies could be focused and enacted. As
Latour (1987) has emphasized, the inscribing of scientific practices translates them
into "stable and combinable mobiles" capable of being aggregated, normalized,
and compared. As such, the construction of R&D statistics provided a condition
for the calculation of national and international norms and averages for R&D activity.
For example, on the basis of the Frascati definitions, OECD and governmental
reports "showed" total R&D expenditure in the United Kingdom as relatively
significant when set against national gross domestic product (see table 1). The
progress of this elementary statistic, the standard measure for national comparative
purposes, was indicative of the newly perceived relationship between scientific
practices and the problems of the national economy.
Given the assumption of a basic relationship that emerged between science and
technology and economic growth, R&D statistics became not merely the "signifier"
of scientific and technological activity but also the key indicators of future market
competitiveness and long term national prosperity. Once R&D statisitics had been
prepared, they could be related to other measures of economic activity to reveal
new relationships and facilitate calculation. From the immediate postwar period
to the late 1960s, R&D expenditure as a proportion of GDP in major industrialized
countries was represented as increasing rapidly, to between 1.5-2.5 percent of
gross domestic product. In this way R&D statistics gave a new visibility to science
and technology at the level of national economies, and measures of R&D in par-
ticular countries have been closely monitored for what their comparison "reveals."
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Table 1.
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
U.K.
U.S.A.
Trends in R&D as
1963
1.00
1.60
1.40
0.60
1.30
2.30
2.90
a Percentage of
7967
1.20
2.29
1.70
0.70
1.30
2.30
2.90
1971
1.20
1.90
2.10
0.90
1.60
2.10
2.60
GDP in
1975
1.00
1.80
2.10
0.90
1.70
2.10
2.30
Selected
1979
1.10
1.80
2.40
.0.80
2.10
2.25
2.35
Countries
1983
1.30
2.05
2.45
1.00
2.50
2.25
2.65
1985
1.34
2.20
2.50
1.20
2.80
2.30
2.90
Source: OECD (1965, 1968, 1975, 1986, 1989).
R&D statistics have apparently shown that the sources of funds for R&D
activities in the United Kingdom have been evenly balanced between governmental
and private organizations. Another apparent national trait is that the major
proportion of U.K. government-sourced R&D funds going to private business has
been devoted to defense procurement (Cabinet Office 1986, chart Cl, 36; cf.
Williams 1973, 15-16).
The development and growth of R&D expenditure statistics provided new
legitimation to a series of discourses that problematized scientific activity in the
United Kingdom. The claim that national scientific expenditure is unsatisfactory
is dependent on the definition of "unsatisfactory," which is itself contingent on the
aims and ideals expressed through these discourses. The rationales for asserting
that U.K. R&D expenditure is problematic are varied and inhabit a wide range of
professional bodies, pressure groups, and state agencies.
The apparent lack of commitment to science spending has been interpreted as a
symptom of an undervaluing of scientists and engineers in U.K. society. As C. P.
Snow (1959) declared in his analysis of Britain's "two cultures," in the context of
what he saw as the scientific revolution, science and technology were too low on
the list of national priorities. A more recent statement of this view suggested that
Science and Technology play a major role in most aspects of our daily lives
both at home and at work. Our industry and thus our national prosperity
depend upon them.. . . Improving that understanding is not a luxury: it is a
vital investment in the future well-being of our society. (Royal Society 1985)
During the 1960s the widespread belief that large numbers of British scientists
were emigrating reflected emergent concerns over the status of science in the
modern British economy (Gummett 1980, 41; Williams 1973, chaps. 1 and 2).2
2
 This problem of the "brain drain" was associated in particular with the program of the Labour
government of 1964-70. Williams (1973, 26) argued that in the United Kingdom the brain drain
concern "mounted almost to panic." The belief that the problems of the British economy were
associated with the inability to translate scientific advances into new technologies (the "technology
gap" — ibid., 21-34) stimulated the founding of the Ministry of Technology and a more directive
science policy. At the same time, the funding given to the Research Councils was increased
substantially.
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Business organizations have queried national levels of R&D expenditure in terms
that suggest the priorities of national education are distorted:
The question whether, if more [R&D] funds were available, there would be
bright scientists to use them properly scarcely needs asking since in many
fields the present shortage of funds, coupled with the expectations of greater
penury to come, has dissuaded some talented youngsters from scientific
careers. There must be an assurance that scientific proficiency is crucial to
the United Kingdom and publicly rewarded. This must obtain right down to
those teaching in junior schools to assure our future. (ICI memorandum,
House of Lords 1986, part 3, p. 143)
Other accounts of the apparent U.K. R&D "crisis" have focused on problems of
government. The culture and hierarchy of the British Civil Service has been said to
lack interest in scientific training and expertise. The publication of the Fulton
Committee Report in the late 1960s reinforced contentions that the
administrative-generalist civil servant is ignorant of, and undervalues, scientific
and technological activity in civil society: "Many scientists, engineers, and members
of other specialist classes get neither the full responsibilities and corresponding
authority, nor the opportunities they ought to have" (Fulton Committee 1968, 8).
Although there may be varying accounts of the causes of an R&D malaise (poor
education; the neglectful state; unscientific culture) and conflicting evidence of its
wider symptoms and effects (lack of scientific personnel — "brain drain," deterio-
ration in terms of trade, declining market shares), statements referencing concern
with the condition of R&D activity in the U.K. economy do reflect at least one
common or overlapping ideal: R&D statistics are located in these discourses in
such a way that they signal something more than merely a measure of scientific and
technological activity. Scientific activity and R&D have been translated from a
measure of techno-science into bench marks of the health of the nation and
portents for, or even determinants of (Edgerton and Hughes 1989,420; cf. Freeman
1987), future economic prosperity: "Advances in science and technology, and the
early exploitation of those advances, are essential to national success" (Cabinet
Office 1987). R&D statistics, and the scientific practices to which they are presumed
to refer, assumed equivalence with competitive position, issues of national produc-
tive strength, and long-term market prospects.
The apparent need for more science, translated into problems of national
competitiveness, may be familiar; but the nature and causes of the problems
identified, and the strategies and solutions put forward to counter such problems
have taken different patterns in different discourses. During the 1980s conditions
have contributed to an intensification of worrying about R&D. And this worrying
has taken a particular form, in line with a new way of thinking about the
conditions that will boost R&D activities and expenditures and thereby promote
growth in the economy.
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Responsibility for Science and Technology in the Managerial Society
Since 1979, Conservative governments have pursued the notion — based loosely
on a particular economic analysis of the macro economy and a neoliberal political
philosophy — that public expenditure had crowded out the private sector in the
United Kingdom, to the detriment of the national economy — as made visible, for
example, by balance of payments statistics, levels of investment, and especially
inflation (Thompson 1984, 1990). Whether this analysis of the problems of the
U.K. economy is true or false, expenditure cuts in the public sector were made in its
name. The cutbacks in funding for research in higher education are one symptom
of this program (ABRC1987,27; Scott 1984). Furthermore, the economic recession
in the United Kingdom of the early 1980s exacerbated the decline of R&D
expenditures in the private sector. Whatever the relative importance of these
contingencies, the impact on R&D, as viewed through OECD and governmental
statistics, appeared unambiguous. In 1986 a House of Lords Select Committee
examining "civil research and development" reported that there was "now growing
evidence, very considerable evidence, even on a GDP basis, as well as a per capita
basis, that we are falling badly behind our competitors in R&D and in technology
and especially development" (House of Lords 1986, part 2).3
The reduction in governmental expenditure on R&D (Cabinet Office 1986,
chap. 2) was made with a very specific purpose and function. Conservative
governments in the United Kingdom throughout the 1980s emphasized the need to
free markets, provide the conditions for the entrepreneurial individual, and put
back into the private sector those services and industries that had previously been
nationalized (Thompson 1986, 1990; Tomlinson 1985). The "privatization" of
economic functioning was intended to apply equally to industry's provisioning for
new products, technologies, and processes. The political philosophy of neoliberal-
ism was unequivocal in apportioning the responsibility for funding of scientific
practices. This allocation of responsibility to the "private" sector, or enterprise,
also rested on the recognition that the most successful and innovating economies
(those of Japan and [West] Germany) had had a far greater proportion of their
total R&D expenditure funded by industry than had that of the United Kingdom
(see table 2). Moreover, the relatively high rates of R&D expenditure in Germany
and Japan revealed by such statistics appeared to confirm the perceived association
between scientific and technological practices and national long-term strength in
industrial competitiveness and production. However, the statistical information
generated by such bodies as the OECD through the 1980s seemed to demonstrate
that U.K. "private sector" responsibility for R&D investment was not being
shouldered.
3
 This assessment was based on the figures for 1984.
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Table 2.
U.S.A.
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
U.K.
Canada
Business Enterprise R&D Expenditure (BERD): National Trends
1985
Million $
78,208.0
26,768.6
14,285.7
8,556.5
3,994.5
9,065.9
2,729.5
Percentage
of total
50.4
17.2
9.2
5.5
2.6
5.8
1.8
Compound real growth
1975-85
5.9
9.8
5.6
4.6
6.3
3.3
9.0
1975-79
4.5
6.6
8.2
3.8
2.6
5.0
7.6
rates (%)
1979-85
6.7
12.0
3.9
5.1
8.9
2.1
10.0
Source: OECD 1989.
The primary thrust of governmental R&D policy was calculated to provide the
circumstances within which industry would provide its own adequate level of
funding for R&D activity. Some of the changes introduced by the Conservatives
had been mooted before the 1979 election (Gummett 1980,53-57); the government
enacted them in a strong program of departmental committees, advisory bodies,
parliamentary committees, structural re-organizations, and funding procedures
(Cabinet Office 1987). A cabinet committee was formed under the chairmanship of
the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, for the assessment of science and technol-
ogy policy. Each governmental department was appointed its own departmental
chief scientist, and a committee of these chief scientists was created to advise the
Cabinet Office. The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology
reported on "engineering R&D" in 1982 and "civil research and development" in
1986. The Cabinet Office's Annual Review of Government Funded R&D was first
published in 1984. And while the dominant political ideology has been neoliberal,
aspects of the government's initiatives have been somewhat more dirigiste in an
effort to spur enterprise (Edgerton and Hughes 1989,429), particularly in the area
of government-funded R&D. For example, the Advisory Body for the Research
Councils (ABRC) structured the assessment procedures for funding of university
research in terms of strategic, industrial, and economic importance. The LINK
programme has attempted to construct closer ties between university research and
industrial applications. In 1987 a national Centre for Exploitation of Science and
Technology (CEST) was set up, funded jointly by "the City" and industry. As
Edgerton and Hughes point out (1989,422-31), some of these policies are rather
loosely coupled with the new-right, free-market philosophy.
A key feature of this program was that no significant quantities of new govern-
ment funding were to go directly into R&D activity (Cabinet Office 1987); indus-
trial managers, in accordance with the valorization of the private sector, had to be
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encouraged to accept their own responsibility for science and technology funding.4
The Cabinet Office response to the 1986 House of Lords Select Committee Report
argued that the "key consideration is effective management Industry must take
the initiative for its R&D programmes" (ibid., 1, 4).
The concept of management and the particular abilities and knowledges em-
ployed by management may be unclear; but again in line with certain economic
and political ideologies, in the 1980s the "manager" emerged as a key figure in the
articulation of economic and national achievement (Maclntyre 1984,26-32; Keat
and Abercrombie 1990; Heelas and Morris 1992). Armed with their neutral, expert
knowledges and techniques, managers had to be left to manage, as an almost
sovereign "right." The Department of Trade and Industry announced in its now
famous 1988 paper, DTI— the Department for Enterprise that the role of
government was not to intervene and direct industry but to provide the conditions
within which "open markets" and "enterprise" could flourish.
Yet by 1986 the foresight of management in funding and enabling R&D in their
organizations began to be subject to doubt within government — in part because
of the evidence of the R&D statistics. Managers had not indicated that they were
fulfilling their responsibilities to this area: "The primary problem is the low level of
industry's investment in R&D" (Cabinet Office 1987, 1).
Seen in these terms, direct political intervention in the functioning of private
organizations offended the ideals of deregulation, free markets, and the encour-
agement of "entrepreneurial" initiative. There appeared to be an impasse between
political concern for the relative decline in U.K. R&D activity, as revealed through
government statistical returns (Cabinet Office 1984), and the rationale for creating
the entrepreneurial or managerial society. One way of reconciling the two, however,
was to extend the domain of economic conceptualization by promoting, within
industrial organizations, new or existing modes of economic calculation for
scientific practices and so encourage individual or corporate responsibility for
R&D by making it visible and calculable (Hopwood 1992).
Connecting Science to the Economy: The Role of Accounting Calculation
The connection forged between R&D, as the measure of science and technology,
and accounting, as a form of economic calculation at the level of the organization,
arose out of the attempt to reconcile science and technology with the ideals of
economic growth and prosperity. Within the specific conditions of possibility that
4
 The possibility of the government providing tax incentives was foreclosed in the Cabinet Office
response to the House of Lords Select Committee, although there is some anecdotal evidence that
companies supported R&D disclosure as a means of promoting such allowances. For tax allowances
to be granted it would be necessary first to "reveal" R&D expenditures and then have them audited.
The issue had been revived in 1986 when, in the run up to the 1987 General Election, the opposition
Labour Party had declared that they would consider incentives for R&D in their next government.
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both enabled and constrained the "problem" of R&D and possible solutions, the
management "tool" of accounting for R&D presented one of the interfaces between
the problem of industrial management's responsibility for R&D, and science and
technology.
The regulation of accounting practices in the United Kingdom was then governed
by a combination of company law requirements and the accounting standards
(statements of standard accounting practice — SSAPs) that were drawn up by a
committee of representatives from the professional accountancy bodies, the Ac-
counting Standards Committee (ASC). Accounting for research and development
had been regulated by SSAP 13, drafted in 1977.
As an outcome of lobbying of the ASC by aerospace and defense contractors
(Hope and Gray 1982), the first SSAP 13 allowed, but did not require firms to
capitalize on the balance sheet categories of "development" expenditure that met a
series of stringent criteria.5 SSAP 13 did not require a company's annual expendi-
ture on R&D to be revealed within company financial reports. The terms of
reference of the working party responsible for revising SSAP specified considera-
tion of R&D disclosure.6
By not requiring disclosure, SSAP 13 allowed firms for whom capitalization of
development expenses was not an option (the majority) to pass R&D expenses
through the profit and loss statement as an undisclosed element of cost of sales. In
theory, and at the extreme, such firms would not necessarily need to calculate their
R&D costs separately to meet the standard. Whether or not this extreme case was
realized in practice, the more important issue was that under the 1977 SSAP 13,
internal scientific and technological practices had no external visibility, and hence
no calculability, at the level of the individual manager or organization.
Accounting calculations, and the visibility they would create, were perceived as
a way of influencing managers' awareness of and responsibilities toward corporate
R&D. For example, the 1986 Report of the House of Lords Committee on Science
and Technology argued strongly for the disclosure of R&D in company accounts:
"The Committee continues to believe that companies should declare their R&D
expenditure in their annual reports.... It would bring home to management their
shortcomings in relation to similar firms" (House of Lords 1986, part 1, para. 6.84;
emphasis added).7 The aspiration to have industrial organizations represent R&D
expenditure in their annual external financial accounts was not directly associated
with external "information," or ex post, effects. The House of Lords Select
Committee, among others, viewed the disclosure of R&D as a mechanism for the
5
 The ASC had originally wanted all forms of R&D expenditure to be expensed in the profit and
loss account as incurred. As this would have influenced adversely the prices paid to aerospace,
electronics, and other defense-related government contractors under the regulations for the definition
of capital employed governing the prices on such contracts, the ASC was the target of strong lobbying
by these industries to allow some form of capitalization of R&D costs. See Hope and Gray 1982.
6
 The DTI did favor R&D disclosure in its submission on the first R&D exposure draft to the ASC
(Hope and Gray 1982).
7
 An earlier committee report had made the same recommendation (House of Lords 1982).
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promotion of R&D practices within private sector organizations in accordance
with the needs of the national economy. By exposing R&D for external reporting
purposes, managers would create for themselves a space for appraising their R&D
activities. In accordance with the mores of the liberal economy, managers would
then be free to choose their R&D strategies, by relating their current actions to
industry norms and national or international averages, to calculate their firm's
long-term competitive position, and to assert their role as responsible and auto-
nomous decision makers. The calculation of R&D expenditure by management
and the disclosure of R&D in company accounts were seen to supply a means of
intervening in the management of research and development activities, but in a
way that preserved a distance between the agencies wishing to promote R&D and
the managers whose behavior they wished to guide: accounting for R&D was a
mechanism through which to "act at a distance" upon the issue of science and
technology and its role in national economic growth (Latour 1987; Miller 1991;
Miller and Rose 1990; Robson 1991, 1992; Rose and Miller 1992).
Evidence of the concern with the economic visibility and calculability of science
and technology is given in the oral reports submitted by the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) and the Treasury to the House of Lords Select Committee on
Science and Technology:
(Mr Roith) [DTI Civil Servant] The DTI is in favour of the declaration of
R&D in company statements. This was a recommendation made in one of
your Lordship's earlier reports.
(Baroness White) Has anything happened? Are there any movements?
(Lord Gregson) They put a voluntary clause in the Companies Act which
nobody takes any notice of.
(Mr Roith) The Committee will be aware that the Accounting Standards
Committee has been considering the possibility of reporting R&D expendi-
ture and revising their advice accordingly. It has not yet come to any
conclusions. Behind the scenes the Department is encouraging the Account-
ing Standards Committee very strongly to introduce some proposals in this
area. (House of Lords 1986, part 2, p. 72).
Accounting for R&D expenditure would allow the initiation of other forms of
"good conduct" for management of R&D to be advanced. For example, good
management of R&D also required the utilization of appropriate methods of
economic calculation for R&D appraisal. Starting with the public sector, the
Treasury throughout the 1980s attempted to reintroduce management to best
practice in investment appraisal and policy analysis (HM Treasury 1984, 1988).
Although it was felt that "the underlying principles for [science and technology]
evaluation are broadly the same as those for other policy evaluation" (HM
Treasury 1988, 17), this program carried over into the economic calculation of
R&D with the publication in 1989 of R&D Assessment: A Guide for Customers
and Managers of Research and Development by the Science and Technology
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Assessment Office of the Cabinet Office. This guide to managers outlined the main
managerial techniques for monitoring and appraisal (e.g., peer review, cost-benefit
analysis, investment appraisal [net present value techniques], program evaluation
and review technique [PERT], and rationale, objectives, appraisal, monitoring,
and evaluation [ROAME]) of corporate R&D projects.
Political rationales for the disclosure of R&D were not confined, however, to
the problem of management responsibility for the economic assessment of science
and technology. Disclosure of R&D also presented the possibility of enhancing the
long-term economic prospects of industrial firms as viewed through financial
calculations of scientific and technological practices. Investors' calculations of
company financial performance could be viewed as seriously incomplete if they
failed to take account of the long-term nature of annual expenditures such as
R&D. Paul Channon, then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, suggested:
"There is clearly with some companies a very considerable communications prob-
lem: they do not allow the City to know what their long-term aims are and what
their research is for and how much they are spending and why" (ibid., 564). Here
the disclosure of R&D was attached to the problem of "short termism" in the
centers of investment calculation. On the one hand, undisclosed R&D expenditures
would pass through the profit and loss account and thereby reduce reported
earnings by an unknown amount. On the other hand, if disclosed, investment
analysts could potentially allow for the reduction of earnings that is an outcome of
investment in science and technology, and also reward the individual firm's
potential for long-term product innovation and growth in market share. Calcula-
tions that are believed to influence share dealers behavior, such as earnings per
share and price/ earnings ratios, could be "corrected," with a related improvement
in the market valuations placed on a company's shares.
Channon's comment laid the responsibility for the R&D problem on manage-
ment, but others argued that the investment problem was centered in the "short
termism" of the City's financial institutions. Managers' actions were constrained
by the short-term, earnings orientation of stock market investors, portfolio man-
agers, and analysts. The House of Lords Committee reported:
If, as many have argued, risk capital is available to British firms only on less
favourable terms than those open to many of their competitors abroad, then
underlining through the annual accounts the importance of R&D strength
might be expected gradually to change this shortsighted view... . This may
lead to only a gradual change in the outlook of shareholders and manage-
ment; but an appreciation of the value of R&D and a more far sighted
outlook must somehow be brought about. (House of Lords, 1986, part 1,
para. 6.84)
Nevertheless, wherever lay the "blame" for underinvestment in R&D and to
whatever the failure of the economy could be attributed, the disclosure of R&D
was seen as a common solution. Those who viewed the decline of expenditure on
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science and technology as a management problem and those who viewed it as an
investor problem could agree on the value of R&D disclosures. And the promotion
of R&D disclosure enabled a form of industrial encouragement by a government
concerned to avoid the ideological contradictions inherent in direct political
intervention or government subsidy. The government responded to the Lords
Committee on Science and Technology recommendation and accepted that "there
is a need to emphasise to shareholders and managers the value of R&D. It is for
companies to ensure that their bankers and major shareholders understand the
advantages of investment in R&D. The reporting of R&D expenditure in annual
accounts will promote this understanding" (Cabinet Office 1987, 6; emphasis
added).
The discourses and rationales of the DTI and other state agencies therefore
seemed clear. At the same time, however, there remained the requirement to enrol
the support of the accounting profession, a process that was lengthy and contested.
The ASC working party first met in September 1982; SSAP 13 (Revised) was
issued in January 1989. The ASC working party were made aware of government
views from a number of sources. Both reports of the House of Lords Select
Committee on Science and Technology (House of Lords 1982,1986) were brought
to the attention of the working party through their secretariat. Views of government
departments were thereby also apparently disclosed. Further, the working party
met with the division of the DTI responsible for the sponsorship of the profession.8
Government representatives from the DTI and the Head of the Governmental
Accountancy Service (HOTGAS) were also present as nonvoting observers of the
ASC; and at several of the meetings where accounting for R&D was discussed, the
DTI representatives spoke up in favor of disclosure. In addition, a number of
ministerial statements on the public record signaled support for R&D disclosure.
For example, Michael Howard, the minister for Corporate Affairs, stated that
legislation would be considered to compel companies to reveal R&D expenditures
(Accountancy Age, 24 October 1985). Other statements, however, were more in
line with the argument that the government wished the ASC to deal with this
disclosure issue.9 The desire for the accounting profession to produce the necessary
regulation accorded with the government's apparent noninterventionist ideology.
The chairman of the ASC argued initially that disclosure of R&D was a
Companies Act problem. The DTI observers on the ASC, however, strongly
supported a new standard requiring R&D disclosure. It was important that the
accountancy profession be perceived as the body responsible for developing and
promoting the regulation on accounting for R&D. The Secretary of State for
8
 This meeting occurred subsequent to the rejection of the working party's recommendation for
disclosure by the ASC (30 October 1985).
9
 A Civil Servant interviewed at the Companies Division of the DTI commented: "In common with
our general sort of approach to these matters we would prefer to see the profession and the users
representatives at the ASC to agree on [disclosure] and promulgate it. And we encourage that process.
But if they can't agree or don't want to and don't think it should be imposed then we will have to face
up to the question 'should government require it?'. . . That is a live issue at the moment."
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Trade and Industry made this clear to the House of Lords Committee:
The voluntary disclosure of R&D in their accounts I think is a very good
idea. As I said I would prefer for it to be voluntary rather than for them to be
compelled to do so by statute. No doubt there will be another Companies
Bill one day. I am perfectly certain that, if there is, someone will table an
amendment to that effect and, if it is carried, I am not going to cry all night,
but I think it would be better if it could be done by agreement. (Paul
Channon in oral evidence to House of Lords Select Committee on Science
and Technology, House of Lords 1986, part 2, para. 1581; emphasis added)
The evidence of Treasury officials to the House of Lords Committee corroborates
the apparent importance attached to the origination of the R&D disclosure
requirement from the "knowledge experts" of the accountancy bodies:
(Lord Butterworth) Have the Treasury or the departments come up with any
interesting ideas about how industry could be persuaded to invest more in
research and development?
(Mr Burgner) [Treasury civil servant] This is a very important and, we think,
difficult topic. It is one that we give quite a lot of thought to and have had
discussions with the DTI.
(Lord Butterworth) I am sure you do but what are the results?
(Mr Burgner) I do not think we have, as yet, a list of results. As to the sort of
thing we would like to see, we think there is a long process of education. The
question really is what levers we can pull to speed up that process of
education. The one positive idea that is under discussion at present is
whether anything can and should be done to give more disclosure of R&D by
companies, and I am sure you know the Accounting Standards Committee
have that under discussion currently. (Ibid., 306; emphasis added)
This strategy was confirmed by other Treasury officials:
The Committee will be aware that the Accounting Standards Committee has
been considering the possibility of reporting R&D expenditure and revising
their advice accordingly. It has not yet come to any conclusions. Behind the
scenes the Department is encouraging the Accounting Standards Committee
very strongly to introduce some proposals in this area. (Oral evidence of Mr
Roith, Treasury civil servant, to House of Lords Select Committee, ibid., 72)
Although it was clear that accounting expertise was being drawn upon to legitimate
the disclosure of R&D, the ASC resisted the disclosure of R&D for four years;
some ASC members objected to the "fashionable" demands for R&D disclosure
that were put upon them. Other commentators (ASC 1988) expressed concern
about the possible commercial secrecy implications or the problem of defining the
relevant costs of R&D departments. But in 1987 the ASC approved a new draft
standard that would demand one-line disclosure in the profit statement of com-
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panies. In January 1989 the SSAP 13 (Revised) requiring disclosure of annual
R&D expenditures was published.
Conclusion
It is unlikely that the new R&D standard will produce the types of consequences
that government agencies have calculated. Companies that disclose high levels of
R&D expenditures could experience the "marking down" of their share valuations
by financial analysts and speculators — in accordance with the effects that high
levels of R&D expenditure would have on dividend returns in the short term.
Further, the mere fact of expenditure on R&D says little in itself about the nature
and caliber of the R&D undertaken. The U.K. accounting profession has also
expressed reservations on the practicalities of apportioning organizational costs to
the category of "R&D," as if such activities were wholly discrete.
Whether the desired effects are realized or not, this review portrays the central
problematization of science and technology in relation to the U.K. national
economy that emerged in the post-World War II era and particularly in the
mid-1980s. And it is worth noting that the failure of such programs of "managing
science by numbers" often become the starting point for further policies of
responsibilization and calculation. Nevertheless the strategies and mechanisms for
drawing science closer to the "market," recently reaffirmed by the government's
White Paper Realising our Potential (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1993),
can be interpreted only against the backcloth of the discourses and rationales of
U.K. government institutions in the 1980s. Science and technology came to be
perceived as a private sector problem, and the solutions proposed aimed at the
self-regulation or responsibilization (Foucault 1982,1988) of managers by "reveal-
ing" and rendering calculable R&D practices at the level of the organization.
Out of the recent problematization of science and technology a multiplicity of
mechanisms have emerged for connecting science to the economic. Accounting
knowledges, investment techniques, and governmental statistics have gradually
put in place a series of linkages for drawing together perceived problems in
national scientific activity. In association with the promotion of other forms of
economic calculation that would be enabled by rendering science and technology
visible to internal and external agencies, accounting calculation has become a way
of acting at a distance upon R&D. Chains of calculation have gradually surrounded
the practices of science and technology in the attempt to make them calculable and
ultimately programable. The development of "stable and combinable mobiles"
representing R&D has created the space within organizations for the calculation
of science and technology, and given or created a visibility to such practices within
the organization. Financial institutions, productive organizations, government
agencies, and other centers of calculation have, through accounting numbers,
gradually become linked to the twin problems of science and the economy.
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